Notes on the History and Philosophy of Science
1. A Conference on the Scope and Philosophy of Geology
By CLAUDE C. ALBRITTON, JR.

I
In October of 1960 a small group of geologists and philosophers
met in Dallas to discuss problems related to the scope and philosophy
of geology. Among the subjects considered were homotaxis and geochronometry, the classification of faults, explanation in historical
geology, the principle of simplicity, the principle of uniformity, the
methodology of geologic mapping, the contribution of geology to
general thought, and the scope of the earth sciences. Messrs. William
E. Benson of the National Science Foundation, Frederick Betz, Jr.
of The Geological Society of America, James Gilluly of the U. S.
Geological Survey, J.M. Harrison of the Geological Survey of Canada,
Harry H. Hess of Princeton University, Mason L. Hill of the Richfield Oil Company, M. King Hubbert of the Shell Development
Company, Luna Leopold of the U. S. Geological Survey, Eugene
Herrin of Southern Methodist University, and Claude C. Albritton,
Jr. represented the geological sciences. The philosophers, outnumbered but not outgunned, were professors Nelson Goodman of the
University of Pennsylvania, Carl G. Hempel of Princeton and John
H. Kultgen of Southern Methodist University.

II
Historically, the conference was a belated outgrowth of recommendations offered in 1949 by the Committee of Geological Education of The Geological Society of America. In the report of this
committee, M. King Hubbert, T. A. Hendricks, and G. A. Thiel
had urged that
...
at all instructional levels from the most elementary to the most advanced, only those inferences be presented to students for which the
essential observational data and the logical steps leading to the inference
have also been presented. The satisfaction of this criteria will compel a
badly needed critical re-examination from the ground up of the logical
structure of geological science ... "

The sentiment was not new: G. K. Gilbert said much the same
thing three-quarters of a century ago. If, however, the exhortations
of Gilbert and the Hubbert Committee have prompted geologists to
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explain their explanations, the fact has gone unnoticed by the anthologists of scientific philosophy. The index of Feigl and Brodbeck's
Readings in the Philosophy of Science, a book of 811 pages, does not
contain the word geology. This is partly the fault of the index, for
Ernst Nagel's essay on historical analysis incidentally relates geophysics and animal ecology as sciences "concerned with the spatiotemporal
distribution and development of individual systems." But no essay in
to my knowledge, in any other college textbook
this volume-nor,
chosen from the vast literature of the
science-was
of
on philosophy
earth sciences.
To what is the neglect of geology by the philosophers of science
due? If Hutton's Theory of the Earth is to be taken as the beginning
of modern geology, the science certainly got off to a sufficiently
theoretical and philosophical start. After a tempest of controversy
between the Neptunists and Vulcanists, however, the Geological
Society of London, beginning in 1807, turned to the less hazardous
occupation of gathering facts. Lyell, writing in 1830, thought that
the Society had at least made geology safe for British consumption .
. . . A new school at last arose who professed the strictest neutrality, and
the utmost indifference to the systems of Werner and Hutton, and who
were resolved diligently to devote their labours to observation . . . But
although the reluctance to theorize was carried somewhat to excess, no
measure could have been more salutary at such a moment than a suspension of all attempts to form what were termed 'theories of the earth'. A
great body of new data were required, and the Geological Society of
London, founded in 1807, conduced greatly to the attainment of this
desirable end. To multiply and record observations, and patiently to await
the result at some future period, was the object proposed by them, and
it was their favourite maxim that the time was not yet come for a general
system of geology, but that all must be content for many years to be exclusively engaged in furnishing materials for future generalizations. By
acting up to these principles with consistency, they in a few years disarmed
all prejudice, and rescued the science from the imputation of being a
dangerous, or at best but a visionary pursuit." (p. 72)

This disposition to describe rather than explain has persisted among
geologists to the present day. Accordingly, most of the philosophical
essays in the geologic literature are given to the explication of terms
and categories, to the methods of classifying the objects of nature,
and to the relationships between two or more of the hundred-odd
specialties into which the earth sciences are now split. Little of this

190

JOURNAL OF THE GRADUATE RESEARCH CENTER

writing would be suitable for a general anthology of the philosophy
of science.
Meanwhile, scholars in other disciplines have been forming their
own opinions of geology. H. E. Bliss categorizes geology as a descriptive and historical science that derives its theory from chemistry and
physics. Charles Frankel states that geology, like history, is "predominantly concerned with discovering individual occurrences that
have taken place at some particular place and time." Professor
Hooykaas is of the opinion that the principle of uniformity, generally
considered a foundation block of geology, actually says more about
the investigator of nature than about nature herself. V. F. Lazen
relates historical geology and paleontology with political history, as
having common aims in the arrangements of events chronologically.
Is it true that geology has no postulates, no theory, no method of
its own? Is the aim of geology simply to pigeonhole natural phenomena? Is geology a historical science-whatever
that may mean?
It was to sift ideas on these and similar questions that the geologists
and philosophers held their conference in Dallas.

III
Perhaps the most important result of the conference was our discovery that philosophers and geologists have certain interests in
common. The principle of uniformity is a case in point. Most of
the geologists present could probably be classified as good dues-paying
uniformitarians. And yet two out of three philosophers could not be
persuaded that uniformity is essential to our science. These heretics
readily agreed that uniformity probably had great heuristic value at
the time Lyell was fighting miracle mongers. But now that scientists
have by and large agreed to operate from an empirical base, and
have moreover accepted the probabilistic nature of natural laws, it
may be misleading to postulate that "all former changes of the
organic and inorganic creation are referrible to one uninterrupted
succession of physical events, governed by the laws now in operation." In any case, "the logical status of uniformity is not clear," as
Bondi so mildly put it in his Joule Memorial Lecture.
Another thing that is not clear is the operation of the principle
of simplicity (parsimony, Occam's razor) in geology. Take a case
in layer-cake stratigraphy: two nearby mesas of three formations
conformably arranged in similar sequence from bottom to top. With-
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out evidence to the contrary, most stratigraphers would recognize
only three formations in all, perhaps on the ground that it is in vain
to do with more what can be done with fewer. But if a three-formation column is simpler than a one-formation column, would it not
be simpler still to lump the three formations into one group, and
then have a single entity? The reasons for not doing so may be compelling, but the example supports Dr. Goodman's contention that the
simplicity of a system cannot be gauged simply by counting its parts.
How do we rationalize our persistent effort to keep formations,
species of minerals and fossils, and feet of fault displacements to
minimal numbers?
The philosophers present were unwilling to accept offhand the
proposition that the end of historical geology is the establishment of
a chronicle for the earth. Dr. Hempel took the view that all sciences,
social and natural, should attempt to explain the phenomena within
their purview. To explain something scientifically is to relate a
phenomenon under examination to its antecedent conditions in such
a way that it could have been predicted on the basis of the regularities that are the natural laws. In historical geology, the phenomena
are usually given, and it is the antecedent conditions that must be
reconstructed. But postdiction, no less than prediction, requires the
intermediary of law. What, then, are the laws of historical geology?
Bucher's The Deformation of the Earth's Crust stands as one of
the few efforts to make geological laws explicit. Many of the 46
laws stated in this book could be cast as statements of univeral form,
thus satisfying Goodman's requirements for lawlike sentences. Biologists have perhaps been less hesitant than geologists in stating their
laws in common language. Thus Rensch includes among his evolutionary laws of interaction with environment the statement that "the
off spring of species taking care of their progeny is less in number
than in related species not taking care of their progeny"-the
Law
of Planned Parenthood, no less! This could be recast in the symbols
of logic, or in the form of mathematical ratios in the case of cuckoos
and robins, but these translations would say no more at bottom than
Rensch said in English.
Other topics of discussion were primarily of interest to the geologists. Dr. Woodford's essay and outline of homotaxis and geochronometry, a penetrating critique of stratigraphic fundamentals, applied
statistical methods to the art of correlating strata. It would be un-
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fair to present W oodford's conclusions here in advance of the supporting data, which all of us hoped he would soon publish.

IV
If the purpose of the conference was to identify problems rather
than solve them, it was successful. The ideas that the principle of
uniformity may now be a false issue in geology, and that the method
of explanation in historical geology may be no wise different from
the method of explanation in science generally, will probably haunt
the geological members of the conference for some time to come.
Hopefully, this conference is one more step toward the production
of a book. In 19 59 the Council of The Geological Society of America
chose the philosophy of geology as a topic for the seventy-fifth anniversary meeting of the Society in 1963. A committee has been appointed to stage a short program and to produce a small book of
essays backed up with a selected bibliography of philosophical writings in the geological literature. Six of the seven members of the
Anniversary Committee attended the Dallas conference.
This :first conference on the scope and philosophy of geology was
sponsored by The Graduate Research Center, Inc. of Texas. To our
patrons, the members of the conference again offer their thanks.

